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Federal economic regulation of domestic air transportation has 
existed in its present form since 1938, despite nearly overwhelming 
evidence that it has promoted inefficiency, hurt consumers by generating 
much-higher-than-necessary fares, and inhibited development of a true 
mass market in air travel. 1 Although suggestions for major regulatory 
2 change were made as early as 1951, only recently has public, 
governmental, and congressional interest in the subject produced 
serious consideration of regulatory revision or elimination. Perhaps 
the most important manifestation of current willingness to reconsider 
3 
airline economic regulation can be found in S. 2551, an administration 
bill entitled the "Aviation Act of 197511, now before the Congress. This bill 
proposes major changes in regulatory arrangements designed to decrease 
governmental control over airline markets, It does, however, stop 
considerably short of full economic deregulation, 
Among the most interesting aspects of the current situation is 
the fact that few firms in the aviation business or in the financial 
community favor the administration bill, and fewer still (perhaps none) 
favor complete deregulation, the policy to which an examination of the 
existing academic literature on the subject would probably lead a 
disinterested observer, Some of this opposition can be explained by 
reference to a general human dislike of uncertainty (especially where 
money is at stake), but much of this opposition undoubtedly stems from 
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participant fears of the financial implications for them of a substantially 
less regulated environment. Some of these fears may in fact be justified 
from the standpoint of an interested party, but others may not be. And 
of course losses to particular interests of benefits gained at public expense 
may not present a convincing public case for opposing changes in airline 
economic regulation, 
In this article, I will attempt a fairly comprehensive, if some­
what cursory, examination of the financial impact of regulatory change 
on the major participants in the air transportation industry. I will 
summarize present regulatory arrangements and use existing knowledge 
to outline their effects on the industry. I will then summarize the pro­
visions of the Aviation Act of 1975 and, drawing on the same body of 
knowledge, attempt to project two possible scenarios which might follow 
from the passage of that bill. Finally, I will attempt to project the impact 
on industry participants of complete deregulation, I have two principal 
purposes: First, to help assess the current positions of parties to the 
deregulation debate by outlining their respective financial interests in 
the outcome; and second, to attempt to provide common ground for that 
debate by projecting the future of the industry under different regulatory 
al'rangements and by articulating the assumptions necessary to make 
such projections, My own views in favor of deregulation have been 
stated elsewhere 4 and I will not repeat them here, 
The existing airline regulatory scheme was enacted in the Civil 
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Aeronautics Act of 1938
5 
and reenacted without significant change in the 
Federal Aviation Act c:;' 1958, 6 The statute was enacted largely at the
behest of the industry and was designed to protect existing carriers 
from competition from new entrants attracted by the bright promise of 
air transportation, 7 Entry into the industry, then as now, was relatively 
easy, and carrier efforts extending back to 1930 had been unable to 
ensure profitability for all existing firms, The Depression of the 19301s 
had produced a favorable legislative environment for efforts to reduce 
the impact of competition throughout the economy and the air carriers 
had to go no farther than the Motor Carrier Act of 19358 to find a suitable
model for the regulatory environment they sought, 
The statute that emerged regulates both entry and rates, The 
Civil Aeronautics Board was created to administer the act, No one can 
engage in interstate, overseas, or foreign air transportation 9 without 
securing from the Board a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
for each route served, IO Carriers in existence at the time of the pas­
sage of the act acquired "grandfather" certificates for routes actually 
served, but all additions or deletions11 of service since and any service 
by new firms require CAB approval, In addition, all carriers subject 
to the CAB 1 s jurisdiction must file tariffs with the Board, 12 which the
Board may approve or suspend, and no service may be offered except 
at rates contained in an approved tariff. 13 Changes in existing tariffs 
require thirty days notice and may be suspended by the Board for 
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investigation of the "lawfulness11
14 of the new tariffs. 15 In addition, the 
Board is empowered, after notice and hearings, to prescribe rates at 
which service shall be offered. 16 
The statute gives the CAB regulatory authority over almost 
every aspect of airline economic matters, with the important specific 
exception that the Board may not "restrict the right of an air carrier to 
add to or change schedules, equipment, accommodations, and 
f 'l't' 11 17 ( . t t . . . aci i ies. , , , i. e, , may no res rain capacity or service compe-
titian), Among the matters other than rates and entry over which the 
18 Board has control are: mail rates and schedules, mergers and 
. 't' 19 t t' t' 1 t' 20 t b t . 
21 acqu1s1 1ons, s a 1s 1ca repor ing, agreemen s e ween carriers, 
unfair competition or deceptive practices, 22 and exemptions from certain 
provisions of the statute. 23 
The Board does not regulate operating practices or other safety 
matters. All such regulation is provided by a separate agency, the 
Federal Aviation Administration (now part of the Department of 
Transportation), and none of the proposals discussed in this article 
purport to change in any way existing safety regulation, The Board's 
activities are entirely confined to economic regulation and this article 
will focus only on the financial effects of changes in economic regulation. 
This statutory regime has produced a relatively concentrated 
industry with considerable excess capacity, No new trunk carriers24
have been certificated since 1938, 25 and the number of trunks has been 
reduced by merger from the original sixteen to ten. The Board has 
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limited route certification so that there are no more than two or three 
potential competitors Jn all but a small handful of markets.26The small 
number of competitors has tended to encourage oligopoly pricing;7and
the CAB' s protective policies have strongly reinforced this tendency. 
A principal result has been high fare levels accompanied by capacity 
and service competition, 
Air carriers operate at varying levels of efficiency, and the 
CAB attempts to set basic fare levels high enough to protect the less 
efficient carriers, Lower-cost carriers, prevented from competing in 
price, offer service amenities designed to attract passengers. Chief 
among these are frequent schedules at low load factors to maximize 
passenger convenience (which means fewer passengers per flight) and 
relatively spacious seating (which increases passenger comfort but 
spreads the cost of operating the flight over fewer seats per plane,). 
The efficient carriers can afford to offer these conveniences because 
their lower costs allow them to make a profit with fewer passengers per 
flight. Although passengers might prefer to sacrifice these conveniences 
for lower fares, the fare levels set by the CAB preclude their being 
offered this option. The result is that, fares being equal, passengers 
choose among airlines on the basis of schedule frequency and comfort, 
Thus the less efficient carriers are forced to match their more efficient 
competitors in these service dimensions, which raises their cost per 
passenger even higher. Since they cannot operate profitably at these 
higher cost levels, they petition the Board for fare increases, and since 
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they are not achieving a rate of return which the Board regards as 
adequate, the Board grants the fare increases and raises the overall 
fare level. At the new fare level, the efficient carriers can afford to 
offer still more schedule convenience and comfort, the less efficient 
carriers are forced again to match them, and the process repeats 
't 1£ 28 i se , 
There is, of course, a limit to this process, When industry 
fare levels are high enough so that further increases will drive away 
passengers representing more revenue than can be raised from the 
remaining traffic, further fare increases cannot help the inefficient 
carriers. At this point, the weaker ones seek merger partners or 
other forms of help (e. g. , capacity reduction agreements) from the 
Board, Fare stability is also achieved temporarily during periods 
where the more efficient carriers make large profits while the less 
efficient carriers barely break even, The more efficient carriers 
make higher profits during these periods than they would under rate 
competition and the less efficient carriers survive. The relatively 
small number of carriers allows these fragile oligopoly arrangements 
to exist during stable or prosperous periods. During periods of poor 
business, however, the efficient carriers exploit their cost advantage 
by using excess capacity (produced by poor traffic growth) to avoid 
losses by capturing business from the inefficient carriers and the 
f 
. 1 29 are spira resumes. 
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The high fare levels and the accompanying service competition 
have produced considerable excess investment in aircraft. Although the 
reported load factor for the domestic trunklines has been quite low - -
50-55% over most of the last decade -- even the low reported figure 
considerably overstates the intensity of capacity utilization, High fare 
levels and high frequencies have allowed and competitively mandated low 
seating densities, so that most of the fleet operates with about 25-35% 
fewer seats installed than would probably be the case in an unregulated 
environment, I have crudely refigured the load factor for the year ended 
August, 1975, adjusting each jet type in the trunkline fleet to its likely 
seating capacity (which is still less for each type than the rather 
uncomfortable maximum allowed by the FAA), and conclude that the 
domestic trunkline load factor for the period was 39% of the available 
capacity, rather than the reported 53%. 30 Since evidence31 suggests 
that an unregulated environment would probably produce average load 
factors in the range of 65 -80%, depending on the mix between long-haul 
and short -haul service and between planeload and scheduled service, 
the present regulatory arrangements have produced enormous underuse 
of existing aircraft capacity. 
This arrangement has tended to benefit airframe manufacturers, 
since it has required relatively large numbers of aircraft to service any 
given level of traffic. In addition, high fare levels without peak-hour 
differentials to encourage passengers to shift their travel time demands 
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from more popular times to less popular times have tended to encourage 
the purchase of large aircraft to accommodate traffic peaks, The low 
breakeven load factors produced by high fares allow the carriers to 
accommodate these peaks in demand and still achieve acceptable 
financial results with light loads at off-peak times, Finally, high per­
mile fares have preserved the economic viability of inefficient aircraft 
whose relatively low capital value has permitted their continued use to. 
maintain schedule frequency. Although the breakeven load factors for 
operating such aircraft may be higher than for the most efficient 
aircraft, the high fare levels permit attainment of these load factors on 
some schedules, Lower fares would raise the breakeven load factor to 
a figure which could be attained on fewer flights and would decrease 
the number of aircraft types on which breakeven loads could be achieved 
even at zero capital costs, thus retiring inefficient types from the fleet, 
Notwithstanding this excess capacity, there has been relative!) 
little capital risk in the trunkline industry. The CAB' s protective route 
arrangements and fare policies have allowed most carriers to avoid even 
the threat of major capital loss, and those that have been so threatened 
have had their investments protected through merger, The acquisition 
and control provisions of the existing act have even tended to protect 
carrier managements from takeover efforts from the most likely sources 
(other firms "engaged in any . , , phase of aeronautics"). 32 Although
earnings have fluctuated widely, ultimate management and capital stability 
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have been extraordinary. 
This, in turn. has encouraged debt investment in the industry. 
Lenders generally require a large enough equity base in a firm to ensure 
that fluctuations in financial results will be absorbed by equity investors 
who are more tolerant of risk and are compensated for risk through 
higher rates of return during favorable periods, The degree of "coverage" 
required is determined by the degree to which fluctuations in earnings can 
affect the security of the debt investment. The CAB's policy of manipu­
lating fares and route awards so as to protect ailing firms and of 
protecting capital investments through merger if all else fails has 
encouraged lenders to supply relatively high percentages of the air 
carriers total capitalization in the form of debt, relying on the CAB 1 s 
policies rather than a substantial equity base to provide the desired 
degree of debt protection, While much of this debt investment has been 
secured by mortgages on the aircraft themselves and is therefore to some 
degree independent of carrier health, much has been in the form of 
general investment in the firm, principally secured by the firm's going 
concern value and the economic value of CAB certificates, These, in 
turn, have been backed by implicit and explicit CAB commitments to 
maintain carrier health and certificate value, 
Airport operators (mostly municipalities or public authorities) 
have also been affected by the present regulatory environment. The 
Board's restrictive entry policies have meant that terminal and financing 
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arrangements need only be made with relatively few carriers, Along 
with the CAB1s commitment to preserving the financial stability of 
existing carriers, this has meant that the identity of the firms with which 
an airport operator must deal remains relatively stable over long periods 
of time, reducing administrative costs and facilitating long-term financing 
arrangements. These arrangements have frequently included carrier 
financial guarantees of airport debt obligations, Such guarantees are 
made much more valuable by the CAB' s commitments to protect carrier 
earnings. For medium-size and smaller city airports, the service 
obligation and concomitant protection conferred by CAB certification has 
been of some help in guaranteeing the service continuity that would justify 
investment in airport facilities, On the other hand, a city served by only 
one or two carriers and without prospect of service from others due to 
CAB entry restrictions may find itself in a poor bargaining position in 
negotiating an airport operating agreement with a large carrier authorb�d 
to serve the city, 
Another side of the financial guarantee coin is that some 
localities have been enabled to indulge a penchant for monument-building 
by the fact that they could rely on the ability of airline guarantors to 
generate the necessary revenues from CAB-protected fares, The new 
Dallas-Fort Worth airport is perhaps the most striking example of this 
phenomenon. 
Finally, present regulatory arrangements have been highly 
beneficial.to unionized airline employees, particularly pilots, A 
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relatively small number of large carriers is less costly to organize 
than would be a more fragmented industry. A strike against a large 
national or regional carrier is nationally disruptive and produces poli-
tical pressures for compromise settlement, Route certification ensures 
h f. "11 1 h k . d . h "k 33 A dt at no 1rm w1 rep ace t e struc carrier ur1ng t e str1 e, n 
route protection and protective rate regulation ensure that wage gains 
from strikes can be extracted from consumers in the form of monopoly 
rents without fear of competition from nonunion firms charging lower 
prices, Since these rents become part of carrier costs, they cannot be 
competed away through service competition, Pilots are especially 
benefited by regulation because those hired are few in number (which 
lowers organizing costs and raises the monopoly rents available per 
person), essential to the functioning of the carrier, and protected from 
competition from a very large labor pool of qualified potential replace-
ments, 
To guess at the financial impact of regulatory change, let me 
try to project environments which might be produced by new arrangements 
and compare them with the salient features of the existing financial 
environment briefly described above. I will discuss three possible 
scenarios: 1) The Aviation Act of 1975 with continued quasi-cartel 
behavior by existing carriers. 2) The Aviation Act with aggressive 
price competition by some existing carriers. 3) Complete deregulation,
with extensive new entry by firms not now holding certificates for 
interstate scheduled air transportation. For brevity's sake, this 
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discussion will necessarily be conclusory and somewhat terse. It is, 
however, grounded in the existing state of the art in airline regulatory 
scholarship, extended to cover new circumstances, 
A 11MinimUin Change" Scenario Under the Aviation Act of 1975 
This projection proceeds on the following assumptions: 
1, Trunkline oligopolists faced with little threat of entry 
recognize market interdependencies, and have learned to avoid vigorous 
. 't' 34 price competi ion. 
2. The tariff mechanism retained in the proposed act will
prevent sudden or hidden price reductions by one carrier and allow the 
other carriers to signal their responses to any filed tariff proposing 
fare cuts, 
3, h 
. d rt'f' l'b l' t' . . 35T e route expansion an ce i icate i era iza ion provisions 
of the new act; confined as they are to existing scheduled carriers, do 
not greatly increase propensity toward price competition and in addition 
are so limited in extent as to make impossible large amounts of new 
service by smaller carriers in the early years of operation under the 
proposed act. 
4. These factors will largely mean that carriers will not make
use of the rate freedom provisions 36 of the act to dramatically lower fares. 
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5. Under the new act, the CAB will continue to severely limit
entry by new carriers who are not affected by existing interdependencies 
(are not members of the existing 11club11). 
We could expect this scenario to have relatively little financial 
impact on all but the least adaptable carriers. Since one or two are so 
precariously balanced financially at present that� move toward more 
competition or lower fares would push them over the brink, we could 
probably anticipate some new mergers. After 1981, 37 the route expansion
provisions would probably somewhat erode the financial value of route 
certificates. But significant certificate protection would remain and 
the absence of really dramatic fare changes would protect existing 
capital structures, In addition, new carriers, who have the greatest
incentive to lower fares and disrupt stable market relationships,would 
still be excluded. Modest declines in fares, coupled perhaps with an 
initially cautious attitude on the part of capital sources, might limit 
new equipment orders somewhat until load factors stabilized, But 
continued low intensity of capital use would preserve intermediate -
term prospects for new aircraft orders. This, coupled with increased 
schedule competition as more efficient existing carriers gained 
increased nonstop service opportunities, might favor the acquisition of 
aircraft smaller than the largest present types, and might allow aircraft 
manufacturers to adapt by offering such aircraft as further Boeing 727.
derivatives or the proposed DC-X-200 twin. This trend would be most 
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favorable financially to manufacturers who could survive a temporary 
slowdown in equipment orders and develop new medium-sized derivatives 
at relatively modest investment expense, It would probably deliver the 
"' coup de grace to Lockheed, Since merged carriers would remain liable 
for airport financial obligations and traffic growth would remain moderate, 
airport operators would not be significantly affected, This scenario would 
have little financial impact on labor, 
An "Extensive Change" Scenario Under the Aviation Act of 1975 
This projection proceeds on the following assumptions: 
1, New market entry made possible by route expansion after 
1981 and to a lesser extent by the certificate liberalization provisions 
before then will reduce the possibility of stable interdependencies 38 and 
ultimately result in fairly vigorous price competition, 
2, Increased potential competition and decreased interdepen-
dency overcome the tendency of the tariff mechanism to discourage 
price competition, 
3. The rate freedom provisions of the proposed act will
facilitate such competition, producing substantial rate declines (in real 
terms) after 1981 and perhaps before if the projected end of stable 
interdependency leads efficient carriers to pursue independent profit 
maximizing strategies on existing routes, These rate declines would 
produce traffic growth rates considerably higher than those now projected, 
4, Under these conditions, entry by new firms would be 
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unnecessary to stimulate existing carriers to engage in vigorous price 
competition, 
This scenario would have much more financial impact on both 
carriers and airframe manufacturers, As lower-cost carriers began to 
set prices based on their own costs, they would exert substantial 
financial pressure on less efficient competitors who could not operate 
profitably at the resulting fare levels. This process would undoubtedly 
begin on routes served by carriers ( e, g, , Continental) 
who have at times been restrained by the CAB from reflecting their lower 
costs in their fare structures, but would gradually spread as these 
carriers expanded their route structures and as matching fares by 
competing carriers produced fare anomalies elsewhere on their systems, 
As the financial impact of this competition became widespread, inefficient 
carriers who could not adapt to the new lower fares might well become 
insolvent. Since both the degree of the financial impact and the number 
of carriers involved would be greater than in the preceding scenario, it 
is fairly likely that not all the insolvent carriers could be absorbed in 
mergers that preserved their existing investments, This would produce 
losses to equity holders and unsecured lenders. Any indication that such 
a process was beginning might accelerate it, since lenders 
might be reluctant to extend further unsecured credit and would attempt 
to minimize their losses, In addition, existing carrier managements 
would undoubtedly find themselves subject to replacement as stockholders 
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and lenders attempted to install managements which could adapt to the 
newly price-competitive conditions, 
To the extent that carrier insolvencies terminated operations by 
the failed firms, the CAB either would be under enormous pressure to 
expand existing efficient carriers or (much less likely) to certificate new 
ones. The result might be some new firms entering, but more likely 
would be the expansion of efficient carriers and a considerable diminution 
of the number of firms in the industry, Of course, to the extent that carrier 
insolvencies simply resulted in capital and management reorganizations of 
the failed firms, operations would continue using the existing route certi­
ficates, The surviving firms might have some difficulty attracting 
unsecured investment until capital sources had adjusted to the uncertainties 
of the new situation, but equipment owned by secured creditors of liquidated 
carriers would certainly be available for lease or purchase by the survivors, 
And equipment owned by reorganized firms would continue to be used. 
Certificates would be less attractive as implicit collateral as the CAB 1 s 
ability to provide earnings protection and capital security through merger 
to certificate holders was impaired, Debt/equity ratios for the industry 
as a whole would tend to change in favor of more equity as lenders sought 
"coverage" as a substitute for CAB protection, Although lenders might 
be reluctant to provide capital during the shakeout period, the ability of 
railroads to obtain capital through decades of 
substandard earnings and even insolvencies suggests that this might not 
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be a severe problem, In any event, individual firms with bright prospects 
probably would be able to raise debt capital without significant difficulty, 
Ultimately, of course, surviving efficient carriers with stable or 
improving earnings records would have no more difficulty securing 
investment capital for expansion than any other prosperous unregulated 
firm. 
A significant decline in fares would undoubtedly lead to more 
intensive capital use as consumers opted for less convenient and 
comfortable price-quality options, Experience in markets where new 
entry has occurred, such as California and Texas intrastate markets or 
New York-San Juan, suggests strongly that most consumers prefer to 
pay less for less comfortable (higher-density seating, higher load 
factors, less inflight service) or less conveniently timed transportation 
than to purchase CAB-style service at CAB fares, (Of course, to the 
extent that sufficient numbers of travelers preferred other, more 
comfortable, service/price combinations to allow them to be offered at 
a profit, such options would be provided, in the same way that first-class 
service is provided now. ) Since the calculations referred to earlier also 
suggest that a 78% increase in trunkline revenue passenger miles could 
be absorbed without requiring new equipment (assuming a load factor of 
70%), a move to price competition at higher load factors would temporarily 
terminate new equipment orders to airframe manufacturers. This state 
of affairs would continue for whatever period was necessary to produce 
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actual or anticipated traffic growth requiring new equipment. If the 
price elasticity of demand for air transportation is as high as I and 
some others believe it is, 39 traffic would expand dramatically over
time as fares came down. During this period airframe manufacturers 
would face severe cash flow problems, alleviated only by orders from 
international and foreign carriers. Manufacturer insolvencies might 
result, but these would almost certainly end in reorganizations rather. 
than liquidations. Once existing capacity was absorbed, the manufac­
turers would face bright prospects. For one thing, much existing 
equipment, particularly older long-haul narrow-bodied jets, could not 
be operated economically in a high-density low-fare market environment. 
These aircraft would fall in capital value (producing losses to investors 
and lenders) as the market revalued them in an effort to keep their total 
operating costs competitive, but many would not be economic even at 
zero capital costs and would have to be replaced, Any further fuel cost 
increases (perhaps brought about by termination of domestic petroleum 
price controls) would accelerate this process, For another, the existing 
product lines of the domestic airframe manufacturers are well-suited in 
their present forms to high-density low-fare service, so no new capital 
investment in the airframe industry would be required to adapt them, 
Finally, traffic growth would be greatly stimulated by low fares, resulting 
ultimately in significant demand for new equipment, 
Ironically, the gradual character of the deregulation provisions 
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of the proposed act would exacerbate the financial problems of airframe 
manufacturers. To the extent that these provisions produced a relatively 
gradual reduction in fare levels over a long period of time, they would 
extend the period during which traffic grew to meet capacity, As the 
prospect of vigorous fare competition became clearer and its effects 
remained uncertain, financing of new equipment acquisitions by some 
carriers might become quite difficult. Only after the future traffic 
growth rates were realized or anticipated would investment in new 
equipment become easily financed, 
This scenario would also present a challenge to airport opera­
tors. As fares declined, traffic would increase dramatically, putting 
pressure on existing terminal facilities, At the same time, the 
financial weakness of the less efficient carriers would impair their 
ability to meet terminal space lease commitments and their ability to 
serve as financial guarantors for airport bonds. The more successful 
competitors would need increased space to accommodate expanding 
traffic, At airports with flexible terminal arrangements (such as Dulles 
or O'Hare), reassignment of gate and waiting areas could easily 
accommodate changes in carrier market shares. At airports like 
Kennedy or Logan (fortunately few in number) where some carriers 
operate exclusive terminals, rearrangements might create difficult 
physical and financial problems. And to the extent that rate flexibility 
allowed cost savings from using less congested or elaborate facilities 
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to be reflected in fares charged passengers, airport authorities that did 
not own local competing satellite airports might find their ability to pay 
transition costs or the costs of over-elaborate facilities impaired by 
competition from less convenient but cheaper satellite airports, 
On the other hand, rising load factors would decrease the 
number of flights operated to accommodate any given level of traffic, 
thus reducing the demand for runway and gate facilities and alleviating. 
environmental problems, Existing facilities would be used more 
intensely, reducing the need to build new airports. Investment would 
be directed toward passenger-handling, rather than aircraft-handling, 
facilities, And increases in the number of passengers handled for any 
given level of environmental disturbance would reduce the per-passenger 
impact of collecting monies from users to alleviate noise problems 
around airports, Finally, the more rapid introduction of efficient 
widebodied aircraft which are also quieter than existing narrowbodied 
equipment would tend to alleviate noise problems even if traffic grew
rapidly. 
Labor unions of the weaker carriers would find themselves with 
less rent to capture and members might suffer losses in real income, 
Successful reorganizations of insolvent carriers by creditors and 
management would undoubtedly require sacrifices by carrier employees, 
Labor agreements involving wage reductions and other adjustments 
recently negotiated between unions and troubled carriers such as Eastern, 
-21-
Pan American, and TWA might be forerunners of the effects of vigorous 
price competition on employees of weaker carriers. Competitive pressure 
on fares would create pressures for increased labor productivity, 
ultimately reducing the number of employees required to handle any 
given level of traffic. On the other hand, as traffic grew, total 
employment might well rise, Increased load factors would mean that 
passenger-handling employees would make up a larger proportion of 
total airline employment, and aircraft-handling employees (e, g. , 
pilots and mechanics) a smaller proportion, 
A "Real Deregulation'' Scenario 
This projection proceeds on the following assumptions: 
l, Entry by new firms is relatively easy. Equipment is avail­
able for lease or purchase, management talent is available from existing 
firms, and an adequate supply of skilled operating personnel is available. 40 
2. The minimum efficient size of an air carrier is quite small
relative to existing trunklines, 41 and there are efficiencies available
from market specialization, 42
3, New firm entrants tend to rely on price competition as the 
principal means of attracting traffic. 
Oddly enough, this scenario would produce more sharply 
adverse near-term financial impact on existing investors and managers, 
but substantially improved intermediate and long -term prospects for 
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carriers, investors, and aircraft manufacturers. It might, however, 
permanently affect adversely the wages paid labor. Many existing firms 
could not survive deregulation in their present form. The more efficient 
and adaptable carriers would survive, although some firm sizes might 
well be reduced, producing some disinvestment even in surviving carriers. 
Managements well adapted to the existing regulatory environment would 
find many of their skills obsolete and would have to adapt or be replaced, 
Unsecured investors and creditors of many existing firms would suffer 
severe losses as the industry reorganized and existing certificate and 
going-concern value disappeared. Secured creditors (equipment 
mortgagees) would suffer much less, although near-term adjustments 
might produce a distress market in aircraft. Over the longer term, 
traffic would grow much faster than in the previous scenarios as prices 
fell dramatically in response to competitive pressures from new entrants, 
and owners of relatively efficient equipment would find their investment. 
protected or enhanced. As in the previous scenario, owners of less 
efficient equipment would suffer financial losses. 
New entry would take place almost immediately, originally in 
the form of new operations by supplemental, intrastate, and perhaps some 
local service carriers. Dramatically expanded traffic response to lower 
fares would produce a true mass market in air travel. Existing aircraft 
available for sale or lease would be immediately available, and as existing 
inefficient carriers were forced to disinvest, their aircraft and personnel 
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would be available to new firms. Intrastate and supplemental carriers 
with surplus capacity would be another source of new capital equipment 
for interstate markets. A wide variety of new services, ranging from 
somewhat inconvenient accommodation in full aircraft to priority seats 
held in reserve at premium prices for last-minute travelers, would 
appear. Off-peak service at reduced prices would lead to more intense 
use of capital equipment. Existing efficient carriers would probably 
expand initially, but some would contract over time as carriers became 
increasingly specialized to survive. Perhaps a few large carriers would 
provide nationwide service primarily for business travelers (much as the 
major national car rental firms do), but each market would also be served 
by smaller firms adapted to particular markets and price-quality options. 
Initially, capital sources might be reluctant to finance new or 
even existing carriers, but this would be counterbalanced by equipment 
available on a leased basis as secured lenders sought to put their existing 
aircraft to productive use. At first venture capital, and later more 
conservative equity and debt capital, would finance new operations as the 
level of uncertainty regarding the future structure and prospects of the 
industry declined. Ultimately, the rapid growth of air travel demand 
would attract new capital to firms demonstrating the ability to survive 
and prosper. A skeptic should bear in mind that the principal capital 
investment required to start a new carrier is tied up in the aircraft, and 
that the aircraft required for new service in the initial stages of deregulation 
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are already in being, Their owners will be forced to find operators for 
them, and leasing the aircraft to new or expanding domestic firms will 
be the principal means available to protect existing investment. 
Aircraft manufacturers will do better than in the second 
scenario, since new traffic growth will occur more quickly and create 
a demand for new equipment. The principal long-term question for the 
airframe industry will be the ability to finance the development of 
aircraft types not now in existence without the support of quantity orders 
from large carriers, Aircraft types already in existence are financed 
now in sales of small numbers to relatively small carriers and there is 
no reason to expect that this would change under deregulation, 
This scenario would produce even greater changes for airport 
operators than the preceding one, From a physical standpoint, it would 
produce greatly increased demand over a relatively short period of time 
for passenger facilities, and increased demand for runway and gate 
capacity as traffic growth outstripped the ability of airlines to accommo­
date it through increased load factors, Some of this growth could be 
accommodated through increased use of facilities at off-peak times. 
Much would have to be accommodated through new construction, which 
might create severe problems of landside access, This would lead to 
more use of existing satellite airports to spread the burden, particularly 
if airport congestion at primary facilities was reflected in the fees 
charged carriers, and hence in the fares charged passengers, and if 
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increased landside access problems negated the locational inconvenience 
to passengers of the satellite airports, 
A mass market served by a larger number of carriers uncom­
mitted by certificate obligations to particular routes would undoubtedly 
lead to simpler, more flexible airport arrangements, Operators would 
be forced to deal with more carriers and to build facilities which could 
be shifted from carrier to carrier as market shares shifted among 
competitors. The Dulles concept (a common terminal linked with 
aircraft by specialized vehicles) might well become more popular as its 
adaptability became more valuable and its drawbacks (the relatively poor 
opportunities for carriers competing in service rather than price to 
provide distinctive, well-identified passenger-handling facilities) became 
less important in a dynamic price-competitive environment, 
Airport operators would become more like independent entre­
preneurs and less like instruments through which the carriers provide 
ground services to the public, A larger number of smaller carriers not 
legally committed to serve any point and not guaranteed the protection 
of the CAB would become ordinary customers of, rather than long-term 
contractors with, airport authorities, who in turn would make their own 
financing arrangements without depending on carriers for guarantees. 
Capital would be supplied to airport operators based on long-term 
demand for their proposed facilities, Fewer, if any, carriers would 
be provided with terminals uniquely suited to their requirements in 
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return for long-term commitni.ents, since long-term commitments on 
the part of the carriers would be less reliable than at present. On the 
other hand, civic monuments would be harder to impose on the carriers 
and the public if alternative service at lower fares reflecting lower 
airport charges was available at competing satellite airports. Smaller 
cities would make do with less elaborate airports than at present as 
fare levels directly reflected airport costs and could be compared with. 
fares from cities with more realistic facilities. In addition, specialist
carriers serving smaller cities would be less likely to use aircraft 
demanding costly and environmentally objectionable runway expansions. 
There is no question that all these changes in the provision of 
airport services would require a dramatic restructuring of existing 
airport financing arrangements, many of them involving existing 
commitments for the next several decades. The transition period could 
be quite difficult, as existing carriers could not meet existing commit-
ments and airport operators were required to exercise a flexibility denied 
to them by existing long-term agreements, Existing carriers might have 
to be excused from long-term agreements, and some would excuse 
themselves through insolvency. Airport operators would probably end up 
refinancing existing debt in a form that did not depend on existing long-
term airline agreements. For large airport operators at busy traffic 
hubs, this would not be a serious problem, since demand for their 
facilities would attract investment, For smaller operators with facilities 
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too large for the traffic they must accommodate, the lack of backing by a 
large, CAB-protected carrier might prove to be a problem. Hopefully, 
traffic growth stimulated by lower fares would considerably alleviate these 
problems over the long run, but for these operators the transition period 
ld b . . 
43 
cou e quite trying. 
Unionized airline employees, particularly pilots, might 
be sharply affected by this scenario. Smaller carriers are 
more expensive to organize, and multiple firms and free route entry 
make the strike weapon much less effective. A strike against a carrier 
whose service represented a relatively small percentage of the national 
total and could be replaced by competing carriers without route 
restrictions would not be sufficiently disruptive to generate political 
intervention. The level of wages which could be paid by a firm unable to 
recover its costs through an industry-wide fare increase would tend to be 
competiti�e:44Lack of route monopolies or oligopolies would eliminate
monopoly rents available for capture by labor unions. And the existence 
of a large pool of eager and qualified unemployed pilots would make an 
attempt to organize the entire pilot population virtually impossible. The 
same would hold true for other classes of airline employees, although 
their present wages are undoubtedly much closer to competitive levels and 
the impact on their earnings would therefore be much less pronounced, 
In sum, the financial impact of regulatory change in the airline
industry is, not surprisingly, very sensitive to assumptions about the 
degree to which the new regime will differ in fact from the existing one, 
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To the extent that the proposed act produces an environment resembling 
deregulation, there will be maximum consumer benefits but substantial 
impact on the principal beneficiaries of the present regulatory 
arrangements -- existing managements, investors whose prosperity 
depends upon the protection of the CAB, and labor unions, especially 
pilots, To the extent that it produces only minimal changes in carrier 
behavior, its protective effects will continue. Unfortunately, the 
origins and effects of airline regulation ensure that, in this case, the 
degree of continued financial protection that can be maintained for 
some is inversely related to the degree of consumer benefit that can 
be achieved by reform, 
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